Training Today's Captains: Why the Gauntlet?

Recently a change has occurred in officer education methodology relating to educating nonbranch-qualified captains within U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) schools. Emphasis is shifting from mission planning (the visualize and describe aspect of battle command) to actual mission execution (the direct aspect of battle command).

Although this change appears to be in the Army's best interest, shifting focus from one aspect to the other shifts the schools' focus from teaching how to think to what to think. Teaching future company commanders how to think provides them a framework with which to solve a variety of tactical problems, given many different organization types. This approach is, therefore, better suited to shaping leaders who can perform across the full spectrum of future tactical scenarios.

The move toward a mission-execution focus comes in the form of an exercise title, The Gauntlet. Proponents of The Gauntlet (a live, multiechelon, shared-training event) seek to conduct a 10-step training model within the TRADOC environment that advocates a task similar to one found in U.S. Army Training and Evaluation Program 7-10, Maintenance and Training Plan, that might read like this:

ACTION: Execute an Assault (UO) [Undelivered Orders].

CONDITIONS: Given a suitable built-up area, a mechanized company team, observers/controllers, a dedicated opposing force, a battalion task force operations order (OPORD) with supporting overlays, necessary classes of supply, and 12 hours within which to plan and execute the mission.

STANDARDS: The company kills, captures, or forces the withdrawal of all enemy in its assigned area. The company conducts the assault by the time specified in the order. The company maintains enough fighting force to repel an enemy counterattack and to conduct follow-on operations. The company complies with rules of engagement (ROE). Collateral damage is minimized.

The collective task implies that the commander and the unit can conduct all supporting tasks, including platoon, squad/section, team/crew, and individual tasks. If a unit cannot conduct supporting individual and collective tasks, however, what value would the results be from the execution of the company-level collective task? Following the 10-step training model ensures that all echelons of a unit are adequately prepared to execute the training event. Assembling ad-hoc units of officer basic, basic noncommissioned officer (NCO), and career course students fails to provide captains with the ability to accomplish the learning objective.

The Gauntlet's multiechelon, shared-training nature can have positive results. However, the results are better attained in the visualize and describe portions of the course where NCOs and junior officers provide feedback on their ability to effectively communicate their visualization of the terrain and the enemy and the expected course of action.

One of the steps required to execute a collective task is to issue a company OPORD. As part of leader training, this objective needs to be executed to the synthesis level on Bloom's hierarchy of cognitive levels.[1] Doing so would ensure that the unit received sufficient guidance to execute the task and that leaders were properly trained in the visualize and describe aspect before directing the execution of the collective task.

If the need to reach a high level of cognitive proficiency on issuing a company order is identified before training begins, will there be time to complete the remaining steps in the 10-step training model? The Infantry Captains Career Course (ICCC) currently takes 18 weeks to train students on an array of situations (light, mechanized, and airborne and air assault organizations; jungle, desert, woodland, and urban environments) in which the students might find themselves. Focusing on the leader-training portion of the 10-step training model allows a focus of effort. The officers' true mentors (battalion commanders, battalion S3s, brigade commanders) can then complete the training without worrying about their captains' ability to execute leader tasks. Directing has a place within a captain's career course, just not a center place.

So, is "less talk-more action" the right thing for captains? Those who support the visualize and describe aspect believe the answer is no. Why is the commander's ability to visualize and describe terrain so important? Because, if a commander cannot determine which terrain best supports establishing a foothold in an urban area, for example, he cannot array his forces to accomplish the unit's purpose. Captains could direct their companies all day, and they might *guess* the best place to enter the objective, but at what cost to the unit?

Guiding a student to realize the concepts of battle command is difficult, even more so if he or she learns the direct aspect before learning the visualize and describe aspect. Consider also the problem of preparing a captain to lead a light

or airborne company or a company from an interim brigade combat team. What about planning jungle, desert, or woodland offensive and defensive operations?

If the Army were to take 18 weeks allotted for the career course to train a company-size unit on all the required supporting tasks of a single Gauntlet exercise, it would produce officers who could only lead one type of unit in one type of environment in a limited capacity.

How many captains could possibly fill the role of company commander during the 18-week Gauntlet exercise? Certainly not all 120 participants. That is why Army training relies on virtual and constructive simulation. The Army has not completely disregarded the direct aspect of battle command, but leveraging constructive and virtual tactical decision games saves time and exposes students to a wider spectrum of possible situations. Thus, gaining units receive a well-rounded captain who has been exposed to and can adapt to many different situations.

The ICCC fully supports the integration of other courses at Fort Benning, Georgia, within its curriculum, which has been the norm for many years. The curriculum includes several constructive and virtual exercises. During the Infantry Officer Basic Course capstone-training event, the tactics department sends three to five captains from each class to participate in live exercises. But, if the hope is to produce full spectrum adaptive leaders capable of performing all aspects of battle command, given the limitations currently experienced, then a mul-tiechelon, shared-training, live exercise such as The Gauntlet is not the answer. TRADOC should consider maintaining a program of instruction similar to that of the ICCC. Today's Army is no place for a leader who has a limited set of credentials. ***MR***

NOTES

1. An explanation of Bloom's Hierarchy can be found online at <www2.rgu.ac.uk/sub/eds/pgcert/specifying/speci6.htm>. Go to <www2.pstcc.cc.tn.us/~babum garner/bloom.htm> to see a chart that synthesizes Bloom's Hierarchy.

Major Steven E. Alexander is a small group instructor and doctrine writer at the Infantry Center, Fort Benning, Georgia. He received a B.S. from Siena College and an M.S. from

The Balancing Act: The Saga of Major Smith

Colonel Jack D. Kem, U.S. Army, Retired

Major Smith was a real physical training (PT) animal. He never made less than a max on his PT test, and he could run with the new lieutenants all day long. As the new executive officer (XO), he looked like an officer at the top of his form.

Having recently graduated from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Smith knew the profession of arms and was truly an expert in his branch. Promoted below the zone to major, he was expected to keep moving up, being promoted below the zone to lieutenant colonel then to battalion command. Of course, he humbly told others he just hoped to make it to 20, but secretly he wanted to command a tactical battalion. His day was coming, and all he had to do was just keep pressing.

The troops and other officers, especially his battalion commander, loved him. They knew he arrived at work before 0500 every morning, and he was frequently the last to leave. In fact, he was famous for kicking people out of their offices after 1800 saying, "Just because I'm inefficient doesn't give you an excuse to stay around here all day."

During CGSC, Smith finished his master's degree and found he really enjoyed the intellectual challenge of working on the degree while attending the Command and General Staff Officers Course. Of course, the word is that a master's degree is not necessary to get promoted, but every little bit helps. It would be a waste to have the extra time in school and not invest it in the future, and some day, he would like to get a doctorate. Dr. Smith! That had a good ring to it!

Going to school changed Smith's reading habits. For years he had been too busy to do serious reading, so at school he made a commitment to himself to stay on top of his professional reading. At a minimum, he read at least a book a month, and he was developing a reading list to give to his staff officers to help them establish the same habit.

Smith. Everyone wanted to be just like him. He was in great shape, well read, and hard working. He was on the road to success. His next Officer Evaluation Report could lock him in for battalion command and even greater things.

Then, Smith's world changed. One Friday night he wanted to get done with work a bit early so he could get home before the kids went to bed. They were growing up so fast! As he started out the door, some of the other officers asked him to go over to the club for a quick officer's call. He knew it was a sincere offer, so he went for a little while, just to sit and talk with some of the officers for an hour or so.

When he got home, his wife met him at the door. Something was wrong—terribly wrong. It was not that late. In fact, he was home earlier than most nights of the week. It was just past the kids' bedtime. They were probably still awake, but his wife had that serious look.

"Are the kids O.K.? Is something wrong, honey?"

"Yes, they're O.K., but there *is* something wrong. Tomorrow the kids and I are leaving. I'm going home to my folks. You're a great guy, and I love you, but you've pushed the kids and me aside. We're not your priority. In fact, I don't think we're even second or third on your list of priorities. So, I've decided it's best we spend some time apart. It will give me time to think things over, and give

you time to focus on your job and your career—and your priorities."

Smith was stunned. This was a bolt out of the blue! He did not know what to do, so he went back to the office. He had a report he needed to work on, and he thought it best to keep busy.

In the office, Smith realized he did not have anyone to really talk to. He had many acquaintances but no real friends. He had always been told it was lonely at the top. The higher in rank you got the fewer true friends you had to really confide in. Most of his close friends were friends from years ago that he had lost touch with. He wanted to call someone, but could not come up with someone he really trusted. He could not call his boss. He got along well with his battalion commander but not on a personal level. The other XOs in the division were great guys, but they were his competition.

He chuckled ruefully. Under the same circumstances, he would have advised other officers to call the chaplain. Now he was the chaplain's rater! Not exactly the kind of relationship that allows you to pour your heart out to the padre. He and his wife had attended a church on a regular basis when he was a lieutenant, but those days were long over. In fact, it had been years since he had really even prayed. Sunday mornings had become a great time to relax and play golf. Now he wished he had a pastor or priest he could call on.

He was a bit surprised that he was taking it all in stride. He felt no emotion. Shouldn't he want to cry? It did strike him that if things did not work out that being a single battalion commander could be a problem. Most brigade commanders liked to have married guys in command to take care of the family-readiness issues. If his wife pushed it, he could also lose half his retirement. After a while, he shook his head in disbelief: "Why am I thinking these things?" A bit ashamed, he returned to his work and stayed through the night. When he finally went home the next morning, the house was empty.

Pieces of the Pie

This story is all too familiar to me. I have seen it happen dozens of times, including, unfortunately to me. What happened? How can you avoid this?

Smith thought he had things in order. He worked hard on his professional and intellectual life, and he kept himself in great shape. Yet, these are only two components of a balanced life. He had allowed these two areas to squeeze out the other parts of his life—the emotional realm of relationships and the spiritual dimension.

My primary image of a balanced life is that of a pie cut into four big pieces. The first piece is the physical part of life and includes health, wellness, and being in physical shape. The second piece is the professional and intellectual part of life. The third piece is the area for relationships—emotional ties to others. The fourth piece is the spiritual dimension. To be balanced, truly balanced, we must keep all the pieces roughly the same size, which requires cultivation and hard work. If one piece of the pie grows in importance, it could shrink or squeeze out some of the others.

The physical dimension. Army officers generally do well in the physical dimension. If you have ever been to a high school reunion, you can remember how shocked you were at how fat and old everyone appeared, even after only a few years. Of course most civilians do not get up and run every day or take PT tests. My definition of the physical dimension, which goes beyond PT, includes such areas as getting enough sleep and eating the right diet. I can go for several months with only three hours of sleep a night, but that does not make doing so good for me. I will have to pay the price later for those extended periods when I pushed the limits. You might be able to keep going for a while on a lunch of a candy bar and a soda, but that is certainly not healthy. The key to maintaining balance in the physical dimension is to have discipline—discipline to get enough sleep on a regular basis, to work out at least three times a week, and to eat right.

The professional and intellectual dimension. A disciplined life-long commitment to reading and studying from a broad spectrum, spending time to reflect on the application of ideas and concepts is essential to achieving balance in the professional and intellectual dimension. I have always been amazed when I learn that an officer has not read a book for years. How can a college graduate not have *some* level of intellectual curiosity? Accordingly, how can officers not demonstrate interest in the profession of arms by staying abreast of changes in doctrine and by reading professional journals? Continued education is a life-long requirement for professionals. The American public expects military professionals to stay on top of their profession. The lives of their sons and daughters depend on us.

Relationships—the emotional dimension. We cannot go it alone, and we should not want to. Cultivating the emotional dimension is hard work and requires a solid commitment of time and effort. Do you remember Harry Chapin's song, *The Cat's in the Cradle*?[1]

"When you coming home, dad?"

"I don't know when, But we'll get together then.

You know we'll have a good time then."

When you retire, will the words to this song haunt you? We all need relationships with our spouses, kids, parents, and friends. We need people to share with, confide in, and love. Why is this so hard? Are we really that busy or self-centered?

A friend of mine has a date with his wife every Friday night. That is their time to go out to eat and be together. They have "dated" for years, and after 30 years of marriage, they still like to be together. You might not be able to spend the same quantity of time with your family and friends as you must spend on the job, but you can make up for that with quality time spent in a disciplined, regular manner. Kissing the kids good night after they are already in bed, night after night, is not the kind of memory you want them to have after they leave home.

The spiritual dimension. It seems to be acceptable to talk about leadership and Army values, but it does not seem to be acceptable to talk about the basis for those values. Where do values come from? Do we wake up one day and have values? Were they implanted when we joined the service? I suspect not. I am not just referring to organized religion or religiosity (demonstrated behaviors such as attending church) when I speak about the spiritual dimension. Rather, I am speaking of an understanding that there is more to life than the here and now (spirituality-internalized beliefs). Albert Einstein once reflected: "Everyone who is seriously involved in the pursuit of science becomes convinced that a spirit is manifest in the laws of the Universe—a spirit vastly superior to that of man, and one in the face of which we with our modest power must feel humble."[2]

Looking beyond the immediate issues of today and reconciling matters of faith, whether that faith is Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Muslim, Christian, or no faith at all, is essential for having a balanced life. Running from spiritual matters, or worse yet, ignoring the spiritual dimension, leaves the foundational question of your purpose in life unanswered.

The Four-Legged Stool

Imagine a stool with four legs. Each leg represents one component of a balanced life: the physical dimension, the professional and intellectual dimension, relationships/the emotional dimension, and the spiritual dimension. There are times, unfortunately, when things happen that are beyond your control. One leg of the stool could be unexpectedly kicked out from under you. You might not have great balance, but you will not topple if the other three legs of the stool are firm.

In 1998 I had the wonderful opportunity to have my chest split open so doctors could ensure that cancer, initially discovered in 1995, had not spread. This was the third time I had to undergo this operation, so I knew exactly how I was going to feel physically for the next several months. The physical leg of my life would again be kicked out rather abruptly.

Fortunately, the other three legs supporting my life were in great shape. My wife and I were close, and she provided great love and support during the preparation, surgery, and recovery. Other friends, including my pastor, were supportive, and I could share with them my fears and doubts, as well as my confidence all would go well. Others at work were behind me, and I had the full support of my command. I was well versed in the medical procedures and understood what was going on, and I had confidence in the surgeons. I was at peace spiritually. I had a strong faith to carry me through this difficult time. Of course there were times when it was a struggle, but I could lean back on the other three legs supporting my life through this difficult time.

Smith was already on shaky ground. Physically he was in decent shape, and he was in good shape professionally and intellectually. Spiritually, however, he was bankrupt. He had pushed that part of his life away long ago. But, he did not realize he was emotionally bankrupt until his wife walked out. He did not have emotional ties or relationships with anyone; he was destined to fail.

At some point in our lives, all of us will have a leg kicked out from under us; it might be a personal tragedy, a health concern, a promotion pass over, or a spiritual trial. The task is to stay balanced and to cultivate all components of our lives.

Values—A Perspective of Priorities

The Army has a wonderful list of values that conveniently spell out the acronym LDRSHIP: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Although I agree all soldiers should possess these traits, I prefer to think of these as virtues rather than values. None of these virtues is more important than the others; we expect all soldiers to embody all of these traits as part of their character. To me, the term values indicates a prioritization. Values pertain to relative worth or importance. What things do you value over others? When you have to make a tough choice, what are your values? What guides those choices? Have you ever really thought this through?

My values, those parts of my life I value the most, include the following:

- God. My faith in God is what I value most and is at the top of my list. I consider my faith in God to be the most enduring relationship in my life—an eternal relationship. When anything else in this world tries to get between my faith in God and me, my relationship with God will win. It is the most important thing to me in my life and is a conscious decision.
- Family. The relationship with my family is a life-long relationship. I value my family relationships in the following order: spouse, children, parents, and my extended family. Long after I have left my job, my family will remain, and I will still value these relationships.
- Country. I love this great country, and I am truly proud to be an American. My citizenship is a lifelong relationship, but it does not have the same enduring quality as my relationship with my family.
- Job. My current job is not of as much value to me as was my job when I was on active duty with the Army. Still, the example of active duty helps illustrate this point. At most, you might be in a unit for three years; you might hold a specific duty position for a year or two at best. Choices between doing what is best for your unit or best for the country as a whole should be easy. If you place a higher value on your country, you have made the decision.

You might not fully agree with my listing of values, or you might have a similar list. The problem is in how to invest your time. Do you invest time and energies based on values, or do you have everything upside down?

Smith might well have agreed with my values, but his actions

showed he valued his own success over everything else. His job was just a ticket-punch to get to the next job, and he was investing great time and effort to make sure he got what he wanted. Was this best for the Army, the country, or was it just self-serving? While everyone wanted to be "just like him," was his legacy one to be proud of? Smith had the best intentions to see his kids before they went to bed that Friday night. His priorities, the things he valued most, showed otherwise.

If you are trying to get your priorities right, values will complement your life most of the time. There will, however, be times when values and priorities compete with each other. Deployments will no doubt compete with time for your family, but deployments do not make the family less important or valued. Letters, e-mail, phone calls, and other ways to stay in touch help keep priorities straight. There might be times when you have to go to work on a Sunday morning, but this should not affect your faith in God. Competing values might require a compromise of time but not priorities.

A problem exists when compromise becomes habit and reflects your true values. Self-assessments should include what you value most. How you spend your time reflects your values. If you say you value your family above your job, your actions should indicate that value. Ask your spouse how you are doing.

If you value your country above your current job, when you become an XO, will you spend all the unit funds at the end of the year to make sure you get the same funding next year? Or, will you be a proper steward of funds and spend only what is necessary? Will it really make a difference what other XOs do?

There will be times when values conflict, and you will have to make choices. You might be told to spend year-end money foolishly just to keep the same funding level for the next year. Such an ultimatum will force you to choose between values, and they might not be complementary. You might go home one day to an ultimatum of "the Army or me." If you already live up to your values, hopefully you will not be presented with such choices. You will have already made a stand, and your actions will be reflective of your values.

You might already be living a balanced life, but a regular self-

MR Almanac

Coming Into its Own: The Contribution of Intelligence at the Battle of Alam Halfa

Captain Kevin D. Smith, U.S. Air Force

What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.

—Sun Tzu[1]

The Battle of Alam Halfa, 30 August–3 September 1942, was the first undisputed victory of British forces over Rommel's Afrika Korps.[2] According to historian George Forty, the Battle of Alam Halfa "was undoubtedly the major turning point in the war in the Western Desert."[3]

Alam Halfa was a defensive battle fought with tanks, aircraft, men, and intelligence. Many intelligence operations, which played critical roles in the British victory, took place hundreds of miles away from the actual battle and had been ongoing for months before the battle.

At Alam Halfa, intelligence operations deserve the credit for the British victory. In a report following the battle, British 8th Army Chief of Intelligence Sir Edgar Williams said that "intelligence came into its own" and was the basis of the victory.[4] How did the British apply intelligence at the Battle of Alam Halfa? Before we answer that question, we must understand what occurred at the battle.

Battlefield Events

The Battle of Alam Halfa was the first battle in North Africa of which British Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery was in command.[5] The battle began on 30 August at 2300 when German Major General Erwin Rommel ordered the Afrika Korps to attack British defenses. The British were waiting for Rommel's forces and met his assault.

Rommel's attack began to fail the first night when his forces were unable to clear a minefield that lay directly in front of his main assault force. By the morning of 31 August 1942, Rommel had failed to achieve a single objective.[6] Rommel continued his assault and turned the Afrika Korps north earlier than originally planned (see map). This move proved to be fatal when tanks, armored cars, half-tracks, and other vehicles found themselves floundering in soft sand.

The Royal Air Force had complete air superiority over the battlefield and continually attacked the Afrika Korps as German and Italian troops attempted to free their vehicles. Vehicles that were not stuck in the sand were slowed because of a lack of petrol that did not arrive as planned. Rommel's forces were trapped between the Alam Halfa ridge and the Quattara Depression, and aircraft attacked his vehicle on six different occasions within a 2-hour period on 3 September.[7]

Having no other option, Rommel ordered his force to retreat the

next day. After the casualties were counted, the Afrika Korps had lost 3,000 soldiers killed, wounded, or missing in action. In addition, 50 tanks and 50 antitank guns were destroyed. Conversely, the British lost just over 1,700 men, close to 70 tanks, and 20 antitank guns.[8]

Ultra's Impact

Ultra was the code name of the British effort to break Germany's ultra-secret and nearly unbreakable Enigma code as well as being the name of the intelligence derived from the code. Enigma was composed of several other codes used by the German Army, Air Force, and Navy.[9] The German High Command thought the code was unbreakable, and the quality and quantity of intelligence gathered through Ultra was remarkable. According to Ralph Bennett in *Intelligence Investigations: How Ultra Changed History*, "Enigma was believed unbreakable, [so] the Germans felt no necessity to seed their messages with disinformation."[10]

Breaking the German code was only half the battle. The information gained had to be distributed to the forces who could exploit it in a timely manner. In Bennett's book, *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy,* Williams elegantly states, "The best half-truth in time [is better] than the whole truth too late."[11] Being able to quickly disseminate Ultra intelligence, specifically Army Ultra intelligence, improved before the Battle of Alam Halfa and proved to make the difference. During and before the Battle of Alam Halfa, Ultra's contribution greatly affected the battle's outcome.

At Alam Halfa, Rommel failed to surprise the British forces who knew almost to the day when he was going to attack. On 17 August, Ultra re-ported that two days earlier Rommel had informed German dictator Adolf Hitler of his plan to begin an offensive by the end of the month if he had enough fuel and ammunition.[12]

On 24 August, Ultra reported that a German offensive was expected on the night of 30-31 August.[13] Ultra validated Montgomery's estimate of how Rommel was going to attack as well as the fact that



German forces had not detected the camouflaged and concealed British forces. While this type of intelligence was of great use, probably the most significant use of Ultra was in attacking Rom-mel's supply lines.

The Afrika Korps almost completely depended on ships for all necessary supplies. Reinforcements of troops, tanks, antitank guns, petrol, and ammunition came by ship from Europe. Ultra provided almost daily intercepts of Italian and German ship convoys bound for North Africa.[14] Armed with this information, the Allies attacked the convoys and cut Rommel off from his much-needed supplies. Ultra intercepts provided information on convoy departure dates and routes and listed specifics as to what each ship would be carrying and to where the supplies were bound. Official Italian naval history calls this period of the war "the hecatomb of the tankers."[15]

In the first three weeks of August, German units under Rommel's command alone consumed twice as many supplies as arrived in theater.[16] To continue his campaign, Rommel required an additional 1,500 trucks, more than 200 tanks, and 16,000 troops. None of this vital equipment and personnel arrived.[17] Forty states that Rommel was "seriously short of everything," before the Battle of Alam Halfa.[18] The problems with Rom-mel's supplies can be directly attributed to Ultra intercepts. Ultra revealed that the disruption to Rommel's fuel supply was having an effect on his ability to begin his offensive.

On 26 August, Ultra confirmed that Rommel had ordered emergency transport of fuel and ammunition, and that these supplies would not arrive until 28 August.[19] For the Battle of Alam Halfa, Rommel had been promised a resupply of petrol, and 2,400 tons of petrol were scheduled to arrive on 28 August. However, thanks in part to Ultra in-tercepts, the Allies sank the three tankers carrying the majority of this much-needed fuel.[20] Only

100 tons of fuel arrived to support Rommel's attack at Alam Halfa.

During August 1942, 41 percent of the total fuel bound for North Africa wound up at the bottom of the Mediterranean.[21] This was the highest percentage of petrol destroyed during a 1-month period for the entire North Africa Campaign, and it occurred precisely when Rommel needed it most.

What is important to recognize about the losses of these ships is that not only was the cargo each ship was carrying lost, each ship's ability to transport cargo in the future was also lost. The total effect of each ship sunk was compounded, therefore, and was actually greater than the tonnage of supplies it carried at the time it sank.

Before his attack, Rommel had stated in a request for more petrol that at the current consumption rate his forces would run out of fuel on 26 August.[22] Lack of fuel caused Rommel to halt his attack on 1 September while waiting to refuel his tanks. By providing the intelligence information that allowed the successful attack on these convoys, Ultra made one of its greatest contributions of the entire war and directly contributed to the British victory at Alam Halfa.

Deception Operations

In *The Art of War,* Sun Tzu says, "All warfare is based upon deception."[23] Deception consists of "measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy's interests."[24] A key element in any deception plan is that it must be based on truth. Only enough false or misleading information should be included to cause the intended effect.

Getting the correct mix of truth and fiction into a deception operation can be challenging. Too much false information can cause the enemy to ignore the deception, either because the deception is seen for what it is or because the information is contradicted by too many other sources of information. Yet, if the deception plan contains too little false information, the enemy might believe the deception but it might fail to have any effect on the enemy's plans.

One of the deception plans that contributed to British success at the Battle of Alam Halfa was the British impersonation of two German spies in Cairo. This deception operation actually exploited a German intelligence-collection operation. Operation Kondor began when two German spies, John Eppler and Peter Monkaster, established an intelligence-collection operation in Cairo.

A Major Smith, from British General Headquarters had become romantically involved with a belly dancer, Hekmeth Fahmy, who was a spy working against the British. Fahmy met with Eppler and began to pass information, which she had received from Smith, to Eppler.[25] Eppler and Monkaster then passed the information, via wireless communications, to a German listening post in Athens. Eppler and Monkaster were captured alive, and with the help of a Jewish agent, the code they used to transmit their messages was broken. The British then impersonated Eppler and Monkaster and transmitted false information to Fahmy.

Because transmissions continued on a regular basis and still provided useful information, Rommel continued to trust Operation Kondor. This enabled the British to use Kondor for deception before the Battle of Alam Halfa. They sent the following message: "Condor [*sic*] calling. Have confirmed message from reliablest source Eighth Army plan to make final stand in battle for Egypt at Alam Halfa. They are still awaiting reinforcements and are not yet ready for more than make-shift defence."[26]

A few days later, the British sent a second message regarding the British order of battle. After receiving this message, Rommel requested the spies in Cairo be awarded the Iron Cross.[27] This observation is important because it shows that Rommel truly believed Kondor was providing reliable information.

Of the deception operations at the Battle of Alam Halfa, probably the most controversial was the creation of a false "going map."[28] What is controversial is whether the map actually affected Rommel's decisions. But before these differing opinions can be discussed, a look at the facts of the deception is in order.

Before the Battle of Alam Halfa, the British produced going maps classifying the terrain in the area according to how suitable it was for vehicle movement. The maps had been created previously by the British for other areas of the desert, and it was known that the Germans had captured some of the maps.

British Major General Francis de Guingand, Montgomery's chief of staff, proposed creating a false going map and allowing it to fall into German hands. Guingand and his staff selected an area south of the Alam Halfa ridge that was soft sand and marked on the map that the area was firm sand. The location of the falsely marked area dovetailed nicely with Montgomery's defensive plan of trapping Rommel's forces as they attacked at Alam Halfa. That the area selected be near the minefields and Rommel's expected route was important. If a different location had been chosen, Rommel's forces might never have gotten near the falsified area, and the deception would have had no effect.

The false going map was delivered to the Germans by another deception plan. The map was placed into a haversack, which in turn was put into a British jeep. The driver for the jeep was Smith, who had been under arrest for his involvement with Fahmy. The jeep, with Smith and the false going map in it, were driven into a German minefield and blown up. German troops later found the jeep and its contents. Accounts are unclear whether Smith was aware or not that he was on a suicide mission or whether he knew of the false going map deception. Either way, he and the false map were delivered to the Germans without arousing suspicion.

That Montgomery had correctly guessed Rommel's plan of attack was critical. Montgomery was able to properly fit together British forces, minefields, and deception plans. Only a few days before the battle,

Ultra confirmed that Montgomery's estimate of Rommel's intentions was correct. Montgomery could anticipate Rommel's every move.

Rommel could move his forces in one of four directions after the minefields were discovered. He had the following options:

1. Continue forward through the minefield regardless of the losses his forces might incur.

2. Move south farther from his objective and toward the impassible Qattara Depression.

3. Move north early but still toward his objective but into impassible soft sand.

4. Order a full retreat during the first day of battle.

Of these, Rommel would not have chosen options 2 and 3 because they would have placed his forces in an area where they would be unable to maneuver. Option 1 was also a poor option but one Rommel might make if he chose to continue his offensive. Option 4 would have allowed Rom-mel to leave the battlefield with his remaining forces to cut his losses. The British believed Rommel would most likely choose either option 1 or 4.

The British deception plan using the false going map changed Rom-mel's options. Instead of turning north into soft sand, he would have the option of turning north onto what he thought was firm sand. When the Battle of Alam Halfa occurred, Rom-mel chose the false option and ordered his forces north into the soft sand.

One of two conclusions can be made about Rommel's knowledge of the terrain. Either he knew nothing about the terrain to his north and hoped it would be passable, or he trusted the false going map and thought the ground was firm.

The controversy that surrounds this deception operation concerns whether the false going map actually affected Rommel's decision. There are three opinions as to the effectiveness of the deception operation. In his book *War, Strategy and Intelligence*, Michael I. Handel outlines the following three opinions:

1. The false going map deception was completely successful.

2. The false going map deception might have had some effect but only because other tactical and strategic operations succeeded.

3. The false going map deception had no effect.[29]

Handel's thoroughness in covering the controversy is not mirrored by an ability to settle it. Handel says little as to the effectiveness of the false map other than that "what is important . . . is that the 'going map ruse' was only one of many other evidently more successful deception plans that preceded the Battle of Alam Halfa."[30]

In *The Desert Generals*, Correlli Barnett writes that Rommel's move north was "forced on him, not by a planted false going map, but by the delays in the minefields and by shortage of petrol."[31] While Barnett is correct, he misses the point of the deception operation. The false going map was never going to force Rom-mel to make a decision that no other evidence supported. A deception operation must be based on fact, and it cannot be too contrary to what the enemy is already predisposed to do.

One final, but key, factor affected the success of British deception plans. Earlier in the desert campaigns, Rommel had quite successfully used wireless intelligence to determine British plans. The commander of Rommel's wireless intelligence was Captain Alfred Seebohm, who had become quite good at determining the British order of battle, dispositions, and intentions. It is fitting that after the British learned of See-bohm's listening post, British wireless intelligence, the Y service, located it.[32] On 10 July, an attack was planned on Seebohm's position on a small group of mounds called the "Hills of Jesus." The attack was successful, and most of the intelligence equipment was captured intact. Seebohm himself was mortally wounded and later died in Cairo.

The British learned much about how Rommel had been able to outfox them in previous battles from the equipment found at the Hills of Jesus. They identified areas of poor British wireless security and made changes.

Probably the biggest blow to Rommel's intelligence-collection ability was Seebohm's loss. Rommel replaced the equipment and again began wireless intelligence-collection, but according to Anthony Cave Brown in *Bodyguard of Lies,* without Seebohm's keen ear for the abnormal, Rommel was "vulnerable to wireless deception."[33] Whether or not Seebohm would have detected British deception plans is debatable. What is not debatable is that intelligence played a large and critical role at the Battle of Alam Halfa.

Making a Difference

Intelligence operations significantly contributed to the British victory at Alam Halfa. No single intelligence operation made the victory possible. Rather, a synthesis of many different intelligence operations came together and demonstrated how valuable intelligence is. From the Ultra intercepts that helped sink Rommel's supply convoys to the deception plans that pushed Rommel into making bad decisions, effective intelligence made victory possible. Without supplies, Rommel had to limit the scope of his attack and alter his plan. This shortage allowed British deception plans to work to the fullest and trap Rommel's armored columns in soft sand where they could be destroyed. While no ground was gained or lost and losses on both sides were roughly equal, Rommel encountered at Alam Halfa his first decisive loss in the desert. Alam Halfa marked the last major offensive for the German army in North Africa and the beginning of the eventual withdrawal by German and Italian forces. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith, trans. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 76. Three different spellings for Alam Halfa (Alam el Halfa and Alam El Halfa) appear in published works on the battle. I have chosen to use Alam Halfa because it is used by *Brasseys Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography* (London: Brasseys, Inc., December 2000). Also, most period maps omit the "el," which means "of" in Arabic.

2. Ralph Bennett, *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1989), 142.

3. George Forty, *The Armies of Rommel* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1997), 150.

4. Bennett, *Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy* 154.

5. Correlli Barnett, *The Desert Generals* (London: William Kimber and Co., Inc., 1960), 241.

6. Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies* (Toronto: Fitzhenry and Whiteside Limited, 1975), 114.

7. Cave Brown, 114.

8. Forty, 190.

9. U.S. Army Air Force, *ULTRA and the History of the United States Strategic Air Force in Europe vs. the German Air Force,* Paul L. Kesaris, ed.

The Combined Action Program: Vietnam

Captain Keith F. Kopets, U.S. Marine Corps

"Of all our innovations in Vietnam none was as successful, as lasting in effect, or as useful for the future as the Combined Action Program [CAP]," wrote U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Lieutenant General (LTG) Lewis Walt in his memoirs.[1] British counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson said CAP was "the best idea I have seen in Vietnam."[2]

The program, undertaken by the USMC during the Vietnam war, was an innovative and unique approach to pacification. In theory, the program was simple; a Marine rifle squad would join forces with a South Vietnamese militia platoon to provide security for local villages. CAP's modus operandi made it unique. While assigned to combined units, Marines would actually live in a militia unit's village.

CAP was a response to the conditions in Vietnam. As the senior command in the I Corps Tactical Zone, the Marines were responsible for securing more than 10,000 square miles of land that included the five northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. More than 2-1/2 million people lived in the I Corps area. Using the militia for local security made sense; there were not enough Marines to go around.

The Marines and the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, disagreed on war strategies. U.S. Army leaders wanted to search and destroy the communists in the rural and less-populated areas of South Vietnam; the Marines wanted to clear and hold the populated areas. CAP was a manifestation of the strategy the Marines felt best suited the conditions in Vietnam.

With U.S. Marines living and fighting side-by-side with the Vietnamese people, CAP seemed to rep-resent an effective, long-term, around-the-clock commitment to combating the Vietnamese communists at the grassroots level. CAP worked well in some locations; elsewhere, its results were transitory at best—with villagers becoming overreliant on the Marines for security.

CAP's Origins

CAP came naturally for the Marine Corps because counterguerrilla warfare was already part of the USMC heritage. From 1915 to 1934, the Corps had a wealth of experience in foreign interventions fighting guerrillas in Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo. For example, the Marines organized and trained the Gendarmerie d'Haiti and the Nacional Dominicana in Haiti and Santo Domingo from 1915 to 1934. In Nicaragua (1926-1933), the Marines organized, trained, and commanded the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua. These organizations were nonpartisan, native constabularies the Marines commanded until host-nation forces could competently assume command.[3]

Senior USMC generals in Vietnam had studied as lieutenants such interventions—called "small wars." But more than that, As Commanding General (CG), Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, LTG Victor H. Krulak was responsible for training and readiness of all the Marines in Vietnam. As CG, III Marine Amphibious Force, Walt directed the operations of all the Marines in I Corps.

Krulak and Walt began their careers during the 1930s and 1940s under the tutelage of such Caribbean Campaign veterans as LTG Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller, Sr., and Major General (MG) Merritt "Red Mike" Edson. In Vietnam, Krulak and Walt applied the lessons they had learned about guerrilla fighting.[4]

When the Marines arrived in South Vietnam in 1965, they occupied and defended three enclaves in the I Corps area: Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai. CAP grew out of an experiment that Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) William W. Taylor's 3d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, conducted near Phu Bai.[5]

Taylor's infantry battalion defended 10 square miles and a critical airfield at Phu Bai. He knew his three rifle companies were not enough to defend that amount of territory. The local population lived in six villages, each nominally defended by a militia platoon. Taylor and his officers brainstormed ideas of how to improve the battalion's defensive posture. They looked to a previously unused resource—the militia platoons.

Taylor's executive officer, Major Cullen C. Zimmerman drafted a plan to incorporate the militia platoons into the battalion's defense. He proposed integrating the militia platoons into the battalion's rifle squads to form a combined unit.

Taylor liked Zimmerman's plan and forwarded it to Colonel Edwin B. Wheeler, the regimental commander. Wheeler also liked the plan and pushed it all the way up the chain of command to Walt and Krulak. Both generals liked the idea, and Walt sold the idea to South Vietnamese General Nguyen Van Chuan. Chuan, who was responsible for the Vietnamese military forces in Phu Bai, agreed to give Walt operational control over the militia platoons operating in Taylor's sector.

Taylor integrated four rifle squads from his battalion with the six local militia platoons in early August 1965. First Lieutenant Paul R. Ek commanded the combined unit, known as a Joint Action Company. Ek, who had already served as an adviser to a U.S. Army Special Forces unit in Vietnam and spoke the language, was well versed in coun-terguerrilla warfare. The Marines in Ek's combined company were volunteers from the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, and each had been carefully screened by Zimmerman.[6]

The Phu Bai experiment yielded promising results. The Marines instilled an aggressive, offensive spirit in their counterparts and gave the militia something it had never had before—leadership. The Marines also learned from the Vietnamese, gaining knowledge of local terrain and learning Vietnamese customs and courtesies. Winning fights

against local enemy guerrillas, Ek's combined unit upset the status quo by driving the communists out of the villages.

Walt seized on the success of Ek's unique company in Phu Bai and approached Vietnamese General Nguyen Chanh Thi, his counterpart, with a proposal to expand the program to include Da Nang and Chu Lai. Walt did not need to put the hard sell on Thi; he was already impressed by the Phu Bai experiment.

CAP Expansion

Because of Walt and Thi's enthusiasm, CAP stopped being an experiment and started becoming an integral part of the Marine Corps' war in the I Corps area. The platoon became the program's basic tactical unit. A 35-man Vietnamese militia platoon, and a 13-Marine rifle squad, with one attached U.S. Navy hospital corpsman, formed the combined-action platoon. This unit lived in and operated out of the local village of the militia platoon.[7]

U.S. and Vietnamese chains of command remained separate. The Marines were only supposed to serve as advisers to their counterparts, and they did—in garrison. In the bush, on patrol, the senior Marine present became the de facto commander of the combined unit.

From the original 6 platoons at the end of 1965, the number of combined units grew to 38 platoons by July 1966. By January 1967, 57 combined platoons operated throughout the I Corps area—31 platoons in the Da Nang enclave and 13 each in the Phu Bai and Chu Lai enclaves. The number of combined platoons peaked at 114 in 1970, and the units had spread throughout the five provinces in the I Corps area.[8]

Increasing the number of combined platoons caused problems for Walt. For one, he needed more Marines. He was robbing Peter to pay Paul by taking men from his two infantry divisions and assigning them to combined units. Headquarters was not sending Walt more men to make up the difference. A limit on troop strength in Vietnam had already been set so as to meet commitments elsewhere.[9]

To get into CAP, Marines needed to be volunteers, have already served 2 months in country yet still have at least 6 months left on their tours, have a recommendation from their commanding officers, and once selected, had to attend a 2-week school, which offered instruction in Vietnamese language and culture and small-unit tactics.[10]

Marine infantry commanders were hesitant to release their best noncommissioned officers for duty with combined units; they knew they would not receive replacements. And because infantry commanders did not always give up their best men for CAP, the quality of combined platoons ranged from outstanding to abysmal, based on the amount of the Marines' experience, proficiency, and maturity.[11]

Walt acted on these problems. In February 1967, he appointed LTC William R. Corson as his Director for Combined Action.[12] Corson was the right man for the job. He had fought with the Marines in the Pacific and Korea and had completed a tour in Vietnam as a tank battalion commander. Corson spoke four Chinese dialects, held a doctor's degree in economics, and had experience in unconventional warfare in Vietnam. He had also served with the Central Intelligence Agency in Southeast Asia from 1958 to 1959, organizing guerrilla operations against the Viet Minh.[13]

Corson believed CAP required its own chain of command and objected to the existing command arrangement that gave local infantry commanders control of the combined units in their areas of responsibility. He did not believe the average infantry battalion commander in Vietnam knew what it took to succeed in the business of pacification. According to writer Robert A. Klyman, Corson "was there to kill enemy. . . . His mission was two up, one back, hot chow. Battalion commanders were not in Vietnam to win the hearts and minds of the people. . . . They were playing the game of . . . search and destroy. They didn't understand the nature of the war they were involved in."[14]

Corson wanted mobility in each of his platoons. "The [combined-action platoon] will [not] function as the garrison of a so-called 'French Fort,'" he wrote.[15] The platoon must "conduct an active, aggressive defense [of its assigned village] to prevent [communist] incursions and attacks directed at the hamlet residents and officials."[16]

In July 1967, Corson drafted a set of standing operating procedures charging each of his platoons with six different missions:

1. Destroy the communist infrastructure within the platoon's area of responsibility.
2. Protect public security; help maintain law and order.
3. Organize local intelligence nets.
4. Participate in civic action and conduct propaganda against the communists.
5. Motivate and instill pride, patriotism, and aggressiveness in the militia.
6. Conduct training for all members of the combined-action platoon in general military subjects, leadership, and language, and increase the proficiency of the militia platoon so it could function effectively without the Marines.[17]

CAP Problems

The relationship between the Marines and the Vietnamese militia was the key to CAP's success. Theoretically, each combined platoon derived its strength from fusing the two primary elements—the militia soldier and the U.S. Marine—into a single operational entity. Because the political climate did not allow Americans to command Vietnamese forces, the Marines had no formal authority over the militia.[18] Walt and Corson hoped decentralized control and close coordination and cooperation could resolve any problems caused by this tenuous command relationship.

There were serious problems with the Vietnamese militia. They were woefully incapable of defending the villages by themselves. One official account reads: "In general, the equipment and training of the [militia] platoons and their unimaginative use in static defensive positions made them a slender reed in the fight against the Viet Cong."[19] At US$19 a month, the militia soldier earned less than half that of his regular Vietnamese Army counterpart.[20] Corruption and graft were accepted practices, and

village chiefs controlled the militia and padded the muster rolls of their platoons to extort the salaries of "ghost" soldiers.[21]

The Marines also had problems. The combined platoons modus operandi—living and fighting alongside the Vietnamese population—required the Marines to adapt to a culture radically different from their own. Most of the Marines were junior enlisted men in their late teens or early twenties. Expecting men of these ages to quickly adapt to such foreign surroundings while also serving in a combat zone was a tall order.[22]

The majority of the Marines who served with combined units from 1965 to 1967 came directly from the infantry. This was not the case, though, as the war continued. From 1968 to 1970, many Marines joined combined platoons from rear-echelon support units and lacked basic infantry skills. In 1969, a senior CAP commander in Quang Tri province wrote of these shortcomings: "Sound tactics are not God-given; they are not inherited or acquired automatically. Not one young corporal or sergeant in a hundred has adequate competence in this field. Their understanding of the proper use of terrain, the control of the point element, all-around security, fire and maneuver, fire superiority, fire control and discipline (to say nothing of the psychological and morale forces involved) leave much to be desired. In six months, I have yet to see any [combined-unit] leader working to improve his own knowledge or understanding of tactics.[23]

Vietnam Strategies

Notwithstanding its problems in execution, CAP seemed a viable strategy for providing local security in South Vietnam. Some analysts speculate there would have been a much different outcome to the war had the United States applied the Marines' strategy on a larger scale.[24] One of the main reasons why the program never expanded beyond the borders of the I Corps area was because General William C. Westmoreland, the senior U.S. Army commander in Vietnam, subscribed to a different strategy.

Westmoreland believed the regular North Vietnamese Army and main-force communist battalions posed the greatest threat to the government of South Vietnam, *not* the guerrillas operating in the south. He pursued a strategy through which he could exploit the U.S. advantage in mobility and firepower to engage the most threatening communist units. After the United States won the "big unit" war against conventional enemy formations, the South Vietnamese Army could focus on the "other war" against the entrenched communist political infrastructure. This formed the philosophical underpinning for the search and destroy attrition strategy.[25]

Krulak believed pacification and protection of the South Vietnamese population—a clear-and-hold approach—was more appropriate than the search-and-destroy attrition strategy. "If the people were for you," he wrote, "you would triumph in the end. If they were against you, the war would bleed you dry, and you would be defeated."[26]

Westmoreland believed population security was a Vietnamese task. However, he did write in his memoirs that CAP was one of the more "ingenious innovations developed in South Vietnam."[27] Westmoreland also offered this explanation: "Although I disseminated information on the [combined action] platoons and their success to other commands, which were free to adopt the idea as local conditions might dictate, I simply had not enough numbers to put a squad of Americans in every village and hamlet; that would have been fragmenting resources and exposing them to defeat in detail."[28]

A Viable Approach

By 1970, "a total of 93 [combined platoons] had been moved to new locations from villages and hamlets deemed able to protect themselves. Of these former CAP hamlets, the official Marine Corps history of the Vietnam war claims that "none ever returned to Viet Cong control."[29] These figures are spurious at best, as are most other attempts to quantify the war in Vietnam.

Edward Palm, an English professor and former CAP Marine, is not as sanguine as the official Marine Corps history: "I would like to believe, with some, that combined action was the best thing we did [in Vietnam]. . . . In my experience, combined action was merely one more untenable article of faith. The truth, I suspect, is that where it seemed to work, combined action wasn't really needed, and where it was, combined action could never work.

"The objective was certainly sound. There was a demonstrable need for an effective grassroots program targeted toward the [communist] infrastructure, for the most part left intact by large-scale search and destroy operations. But combined action came too little, too late. The [communist] infrastructure was too deeply entrenched, literally as well as figuratively, in some places. They had had more than 20 years to win hearts and minds before we blundered onto the scene. We were naïve to think 13 Marines and a Navy corpsman could make much difference in such a setting. The cultural gulf was just unbridgeable out in the countryside."[30]

Even at its zenith of 2,220 men, CAP represented only 2.8 percent of the 79,000 Marines in Vietnam. Yet during its 5-year lifespan, combined units secured more than 800 hamlets in the I Corps area, protecting more than 500,000 Vietnamese civilians.[31]

CAP was not the magic ingredient that would have won the war in Vietnam, but it was a viable approach to counterguerrilla warfare, worthy of further study. What better way was there for learning about the enemy in such a war than fighting with the militia and living with the local populace? No wonder CAP Marines became some of the best sources of intelligence in the Vietnam war as well as some of the best small-unit leaders. They had to be, operating as they did, in order to survive. Air strikes, free-fire zones, and massive demonstrations of firepower were commonplace throughout South Vietnam, but such were rare occurrences near villages with combined-action platoons.

The Battle for Hue City and the siege at Khe Sanh dominate the literature about the Marines in Vietnam. CAP, however, was the Corps' greatest innovation during

the war. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Lewis W. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy: A General's Report on the War in Vietnam* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), 105.
2. Quoted in Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1986), 174.
3. On the Marines in Nicaragua, *see* Neill Macaulay, *The Sandino Affair* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967). On the Marines in Hispaniola, *see* Hans Schmidt, *Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987), 74-95. *See also* Graham A. Cosmas, "Cacos and Caudillos: Marines and Counterinsurgency in Hispaniola, 1915-1924," in *New Interpretations in Naval History: Selected Papers from the Ninth Naval History Symposium,* William R. Roberts and Jack Sweetman, eds. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 293-308. For a comparison of CAP with the constabularies the Marines organized in Latin America, *see* Lawrence A. Yates, "A Feather in their CAP? The Marines' Combined Action Program in Vietnam," in ibid., 320-1.
4. Victor H. Krulak, *First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 190-1; Walt, 29; Jon T. Hoffman, *Once a Legend: "Red Mike" Edson of the Marine Raiders* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994), 98, 122-3. Puller and Edson, who served with distinction as officers in the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, also served successively as small-wars instructors during the 1930s. Walt and Krulak were their students and, as captains, served with Edson and Puller in the Pacific during World War II.
5. Ibid., 38-40.
6. Robert A. Klyman, "The Combined Action Program: An Alternative Not Taken" (Honors thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1986), 4-5; Michael Duane Weltsch, "The Future Role of the Combined Action Program" (Master of Military Art and Science thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 1991), 57-65.
7. III MAF [Marine Amphibious Force] Force Order 3121.4A, sub [subject]: SOP [Standing Operation Procedures] for the Combined Action Program, dtd [dated] 17 July 1967 (hereafter, CAP SOP), in CAF [Combined Action Force] History and SOP Folder, Box 2, Pacification Study Docs [Documents], Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Washington, DC; Jack Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam 1966: An Expanding War* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1982), 239-43; Gary L. Tefler, Lane Rogers, and V. Keith Fleming, Jr., *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967: Fighting the North Vietnamese* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1984), 186-95; William R. Corson, *The Betrayal* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), 181-3.
8. Shulimson, 239; Tefler, et al., 187; Weltsch, 65.
9. Corson, 178.
10. CAP SOP; Corson, 183-4; Edward F. Palm, "Tiger Papa Three: A Memoir of the Combined Action Program," *Marine Corps Gazette* (January 1988), 35; CAP School syllabus, 21 August-1 September 1967, and CAP School diploma, dated 25 February 1969, *in* Michael E. Peterson, "The Combined Action Platoons: The U.S. Marines' Other War in Vietnam" (M.A. thesis, The University of Oregon, Eugene, 1988), 285-91. Peterson is a CAP veteran. Praeger Publishers published this thesis in 1989.
11. Ltr [Letter], CG [Commanding General], III MAF to CG FMFPac [Fleet Marine Force Pacific], sub: Combined Action Group Headquarters, Organization, Equipment, Functions and Concept of Operations, dtd 4 May 1967, MCHC; Ltr, CO [Commanding Officer], CAF to CG, XXIV Corps, sub: CORDS [Civil Operations for Rural Development Support] Survey of CAP Villages, dtd 24 March 1970, MCHC (hereafter, Ltr, CO, CAF). *See also* Ronald H. Spector, *After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam* (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 195; Shulimson, 240; Klyman, 13. Klyman quotes Colonel G.E. Jerue, a former regimental commander in the 3d Marine Division: "Although the requirement states that they [CAP Marines] should be volunteers, it doesn't demand volunteers. We more or less had to go by the rule of thumb that if the man doesn't object, he is a volunteer for it."
12. Corson, 179-80.
13. Peterson (Praeger), 39-41.
14. Klyman, 22.
15. CAP SOP.
16. Ibid.
17. Ltr, CO, 4th CAG [Combined Action Group] to 4th CAG CACO [Combined Action Company] Commanders, sub: Tactical Operations, Policies and Guidance, dtd 14 January 1969, MCHC (hereafter, Ltr, CO, 4th CAG); Corson, 174-98; CAP SOP.
18. CAP SOP; Corson, 183-4; Palm, 35; CAP School syllabus and CAP School diploma *in* Peterson, 285-91.
19. Richard A. Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 34-35.
20. Russel H. Stolfi, *U.S. Marine Corps Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam, March 1965-March 1966* (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G3 Division, HQMC, 1968), 39.
21. Krulak, 187-189; David H. Wagner, "A Handful of Marines," *Marine Corps Gazette* (March 1968), 45; Hunt, 91.
22. Hunt, 39.
23. *See* Ltr, CO, CAF.
24. Ltr, CO 4th CAG.
25. Krepinevich, 172-7. Krepinevich argues in favor of expanding combined action throughout Vietnam. Unfortunately, his approach does not take full account of the recruiting problem that would accompany such an expansion. Spector highlights a few of the problems: "The ideal CAP Marine was a cool and efficient infantry fighter, not only expert in the skills of combat but able to impart these skills to an untrained, uneducated farmer who spoke little or no English. At the same time, he was a patient, subtle, and resourceful community organizer, able to overcome cultural barriers and prejudice to win the hearts and minds of the villagers. Such men, if they existed at all, were in short supply" (195).
26. George C. Herring, *America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 2d ed.* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986), 150; Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America,* rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1993), 580; Phillip B. Davidson, *Vietnam at War: The History, 1946-1975* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1991), 352-4; William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York: Dell, 1980), 215-6.
27. Krulak, 194; *see also* Neil Sheehan, *A Bright and Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988), 629-33.
28. Westmoreland, 216.
29. Ibid.
30. Graham A. Cosmas and Terrence P. Murray, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam: Vietnamization and Redeployment, 1970-1971* (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1986), 149. For a description of a successful combined platoon, see Francis J. West, *The Village* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). West tells the story of the Binh Nghia combined platoon, which operated from May 1966 to October 1967 near Chu Lai.

MR Book Reviews

CHINA AND THE VIETNAM WARS, 1950-1975, Qiang Zhai, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2000, 320 pages, $49.95/$19.95.

China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975; is one of many about Chinese involvement in the Indochina Wars. Qiang Zhai is one of the first to use recently opened Chinese archives; the many memoirs, diaries, and documentary collections published in China over the last decade; and secondary works based on archival sources. He concentrates exclusively on the policies and personalities of those involved in China's Vietnam policy. This is not a definitive study. Many American, Russian, Chinese, and Vietnamese archives are still closed, but it does begin to shed light on reasons for Chinese behavior during the period.

Chinese support for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) is an important part of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) diplomatic history and the Cold War in Asia. Ho Chi Minh called the Chinese "comrades plus brothers" during the height of their influence.

In the first 25 years of its existence, the PRC aided the DRV against France and the United States. With varying degrees of success, the DRV used Chinese models in the 1950s and 1960s to fight the French and rebuild the north after the First Indochina War. However, between 1968 and 1972, China adjusted its diplomatic strategy, and the Sino-Vietnamese alliance slowly fell apart. By 1975, the alliance was in disarray, and China faced the prospect of an alliance between Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

Zhai traces the course of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance and shows how events in Laos and Cambodia influenced Chinese policy toward Vietnam. He eschews impersonal social scientific models to explain change. Instead, he highlights the individual's role in making history, framing his discussion by identifying four interwoven motives that influenced Chinese policy: geopolitical realities; a sense of obligation and mission to aid a fraternal Communist party and promote Asian anti-imperialist revolutionary movements; personality; and using foreign affairs to promote a domestic political agenda.

Zhai emphasizes Mao Zedong's role as a charismatic revolutionary visionary who set the general framework of China's foreign policy. Mao made the crucial decisions to aid Ho Chi Minh, confront U.S. pressure, accept or reject Soviet ini-

tiatives, and change Chinese policy toward the United States. His close associates implemented these decisions. While they all made mistakes, they shared victories, and their actions left a deep imprint on Sino-Vietnamese relations.

Throughout the entire period, there was an underlying tension in the Sino-Vietnamese alliance. Just as the DRV needed Chinese aid against the French and the Americans, the PRC needed Vietnamese support to break out of the ring of U.S. alliances. As Sino-Soviet tensions increased, Hanoi tried to stay neutral, but Beijing insisted on the DRV's endorsement of its policies and viewed it as a tool of Chinese foreign policy. Other alliance tensions came from competing visions of the two countries' role in Indochina. These originated in historical memory and in the more practical concerns for national prestige and destiny.

Mao believed his way of revolutionary theory and practice had universal significance. In this, he resembled Chinese emperors and their belief in the superiority of Chinese experience and institutions. Zhai shows Mao's perplexity and frustration when the Vietnamese refused to follow his instructions in the Sino-Soviet dispute or in their relations with the United States.

Ho Chi Minh and his associates were also students of history. They aimed to free Vietnam from foreign domination—Western or Chinese. They belonged to a tradition that prized independence from China and aspired to realize a Vietnamese political destiny to dominate Indochina. Thus, when the war concluded in 1975, the United States was not the only loser. Only the North Vietnamese won, for instead of a secure southern border, China faced insecurity as Vietnam moved closer to the Soviet Union.

Zhai's study shows that realpolitik is not the only language of international politics. He demonstrates that Mao and his revolutionary comrades were also motivated by ideas. China's leaders thought of self-preservation and national aggrandizement, as exemplified in their policies in Laos and Cambodia, but they were also motivated by a concept of justice. While they responded to changes in international politics, they also had beliefs and convictions and were driven by a vision of China's future, which ultimately determined foreign policy. The Vietnamese saw Mao's insistence on the centrality of the Chinese model and experience as arrogant, bigoted, and prejudiced.

Lewis Bernstein, ***Senior Historian, SMDC, Huntsville, Alabama***

VINEGAR JOE'S WAR: Stilwell's Campaigns for Burma, Nathan N. Prefer, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 2000, 312 pages, $29.95.

Vinegar Joe's War: Stilwell's Campaigns for Burma, is slightly mistitled. The focus is not so much on General Joseph W. Stilwell as much as on U.S. involvement in the Burma Campaign with the glamorously nicknamed Merrill Marauders.

Nathan N. Prefer takes the reader from a call for volunteers to when the unit disbanded. The murky command relationship in the Burma theater of operations is critical in understanding why Stilwell used the unit for so many daring missions. Yet, Prefer glosses over the command relationship and never quite goes into the depth required to gain a full understanding of the complexities involved.

Burma was a British theater of operations, and the Japanese were threatening the weak British forces in India, which were protecting the only remaining supply route for Mainland China. This led to Chinese involvement in clearing northern Burma to allow the opening of the Ledo road and to shorten fighter coverage for transports flying the Hump.

Stilwell was never truly in charge of the Chinese Army assigned under his control, and he never could rely on the force to accomplish its assigned orders or missions. This led to his requesting and finally obtaining the 5307th Composite Unit, better known as Merrill's Marauders.

The Marauders were patterned after the British Chindits, a long-range penetration force organized and trained by the unorthodox General Orde Wingate. The Chindits operated behind enemy lines and conducted small-scale actions to disrupt lines of communications. The Chindits trained the Marauders to conduct similar missions as a penetration group operating behind enemy lines.

The unit required nothing but air resupply throughout the campaign. Overcoming the obstacles of the complex terrain required detailed training and preparation. The techniques developed for causality evac-uation and medical treatment are informative, and the insight gained about the consequences of an improper diet is worth study. Also, the lack of training in fieldcraft seems almost criminal in its oversight. Simple things like boiling water and personnel hygiene were critical in keeping down nonbattle casualties. This book naturally leads to the question, "How would I train a force to operate and be successful in this type of warfare?"

Prefer's book is insightful and thought-provoking. As the U.S. Army tackles new concepts of strategic deployability and smaller, more widespread operations in noncontiguous operations in areas with little to no infrastructure, it is essential to learn from such historical examples.

LTC Billy J. Hadfield, ***U.S. Army, Beavercreek, Ohio***

COMBAT OPERATIONS: Stemming the Tide, John M. Carland, Center of Military History, Washington, DC, 2000, 410 pages, $43.00.

Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide is the second in a series of four volumes about the history of U.S. Army combat operations in Vietnam. The book covers the first 18 months of combat and completes the operational history from May 1965 to October 1967.

Combat Operations is not an analysis of operations during that period; it is a description of events—a chronicle—that only occasionally approaches an analytical account. Even so, Carland clearly presents the tension within the Army and civilian officials in Washington between strategies of "main force combat and pacification."

Competing strategies, with the incompetence and corruption of South

Vietnamese officials and President Lyndon Johnson's unwillingness to provide the resources requested by General William Westmoreland, left Army commanders with an operational concept that vacillated from preventing the collapse of South Vietnam, fighting to defeat the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, to winning the hearts and minds of the people.

Twenty-seven maps contribute significantly to the book, which is replete with footnotes from original sources found in the National Archives and the U.S. Army Center of Military History. The thousands of captured documents in the Archives are particularly relevant and provide invaluable insight into the thinking of North Vietnamese commanders.

Beginning in 1993, Carland conducted many interviews with operational- and tactical-level commanders in Vietnam. In hindsight, several of these commanders candidly recognized that, rather than pursuing an enemy based on excellent intelligence, they were actually thrashing around blindly.

Richard L. Kiper, *Ph.D.,*
Leavenworth, Kansas

BELORUSSIA 1944: The Soviet General Staff Study, David M. Glantz and Harold S. Orenstein, trans. and eds., Frank Cass, London. Distributed by International Specialized Books, Portland, OR, 2001, 337 pages, $39.50.

Belorussia 1944: The Soviet General Staff Study moves on several planes for the professional soldier and military historian. The Belo-russia operation, a multifront offensive from 23 June to 29 August 1944, initiated a strategic offensive by the Red Army to tie down German units on the Eastern Front while allies established a Western Front after the Normandy invasion.

The operation exhibited Red Army operational-level capabilities after three years of surviving and driving back the German invasion. The staff study, source material from a Soviet perspective, covers preparation, penetration of German defense, offense in depth, encirclement, liquidation of the Minsk encirclement, and pursuit.

On another plane, Soviet Lieutenant-General E.A. Shilovsky, supervisor and editor of the study, illustrates a fascinating part of the Red Army general staff's ability to change army operations through the Directorate of the Exploitation of War Experience. Shilovsky, groomed as a military thinker, produced a 1939 study on World War I breakthrough operations. At mid-war, he observed Western and Bryansk fronts during the Red Army Kursk counteroffensive and published an excellent guide to the preparation, attack, and exploitation phases of a breakthrough operation. These lessons were applied in the Belorussia operation. In 1944, Shilovsky wrote and published *Front Breakthrough* (out of print) in which he explains the analytic structure for operational-level offensive breakthroughs.

Belorussia 1944 represents an example of how the Red Army tapped its institutions and war college for historical study and incorporation of analytical conclusions to create a complex adaptive process, which offers thought for future forces. In a rudimentary fashion, the Red Army established feedback processes for adapting and changing its fighting force in the face of catastrophic defeat.

In future warfare, with blurred lines among tactical, operational, and strategic levels, fighting staffs will require different forces, operational concepts, and execution. Similar exploitation of war experience in military history, which will not only heuristically anchor understanding of the many levels of war but guide applications of information technology, new sciences, and military thought for future complex adaptive forces capable of operational change during the course of an operation, will further blur boundaries.

Leaders cannot fight a war without maps, and they cannot study an operation without good maps. The editors include a compilation of detailed operational maps that significantly contribute to this book. *Belorussia 1944* is gist for a professional soldier's mill; it would be a valuable addition to any private military history library.

COL Richard N. Armstrong, *USA,*
Retired, Copperas Cove, Texas

AIR ASSAULT FROM THE SEA, Patrick Allen, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2000, 136 pages, $39.95.

In today's low-intensity conflict environment, the ability to project power from the sea has taken on new dimensions. This had led to the birth of new technologies designed to rapidly place forces on a beach and defeat an enemy through the doctrines of combined arms and vertical envelopment. These tactical doctrines, with more than a dozen different types of maneuvers from the sea, comprise today's amphibious operations.

The list of capabilities an amphibious platform provides ranges from evacuating citizens from a hostile shore, known as noncombatant evacuation operations, to the tactical recovery of an air pilot, to all points in between. Warships, landing craft, helicopters, and weapons systems have been specifically designed to land over 900 marines that comprise the battalion landing team.

Patrick Allen's marvelous book brims with photographs that portray U.S. amphibious capabilities as well as those of allies. The United Kingdom is second only to the United States in amphibious capability. The Royal Navy commissioned the H.M.S. *Ocean* in 1998, which is a 21,500-ton variant of the Iwo Jima-Class landing platform, helicopter (LPH). By 2004, *Ocean* will be joined by two smaller landing platform, dock (LPD)-class ships—the H.M.S. *Albion* and the *Bulwark*—to make up what is called an amphibious ready force, the English equivalent of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps amphibious ready group. Featured for the United States is the USS *Bataan* (LHD-5), which is one of the newer 40,500-ton, large-deck, amphibious warships commissioned in 1997.

Seventy percent of the world's population lives on or within 300 miles of a coast. The littorals, as this is called, have become an important part of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps considerations. Other nations are also investing scarce defense resources on amphibious capabilities. The Royal Dutch Navy's 12,800-ton HNLMS *Rotterdam* LPD can carry 600

marines and accommodate up to 800 marines for a short period of time. Entering service in 1998, the *Rotterdam* is part of the United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Force, a defense concept that might soon include Spain. The Italians have embarked their famed San Marco Battalion on-board one of two LPDs—the ITS *San Marco* or the *San Giorgio*. The French have added the FS *Foudre,* which is an LPD that displaces 11,900 tons and is part of the armada that was assembled during the Persian Gulf war.

This excellent volume is easy to read and bursting with dramatic photos. Those interested in joint operations and the absolute importance of combining land, sea, and air capabilities will enjoy this book.

LT Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, ***USN, Gaithersburg, Maryland***

JAPANESE PRISONERS OF WAR, Philip Towle, Margaret Kosuge, and Yoichi Kibata, eds., Hambledon, NY, 2000, 195 pages, $29.95.

Japanese Prisoners of War contains 11 essays that explore the various aspects of prisoners of war (POW) operations in the Pacific Theater of Operations during World War II. Primarily about Japanese and British prisoners of war, the essays tangentially discuss Australian and U.S. prisoners of war.

Each essayist has his own perspective, which gives the book an eclectic voice and allows the reader to interpret the World War II POW phenomenon in many ways. For example, one essay talks of prisoners of war in relation to international law; another considers the influence of Japanese culture on Japanese POW war operations and policies.

One idea that emerges is the importance of culture in understanding the POW experience. International law at the time was more or less predicated on a European set of values vis-à-vis the League of Nations.

This book's relevance pertains to international law and the laws of war. This is an easy-to-read, well-paced book, and it contains little jargon. The essays are not so lengthy or focused that they alienate an average reader. However, it helps to have knowledge of the subject before beginning.

CPL David J. Schepp, ***USA, Fort Benning, Georgia***

TAKING HAITI: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940, Mary A. Renda, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, 440 pages, $49.95.

The early-20th-century occupation of Haiti by the U.S. Marine Corps, once the subject of exotic folklore, has largely been forgotten. Mary A. Renda revisits this part of history, primarily through a content analysis of memoirs, cartoons, literature, art, and other pop culture from the era.

Renda argues that the occupation was the start of an imperialist trend in U.S. foreign policy, marked by paternalism, racism, and sexism. The Haitian encounter ultimately failed at its goal of "cultural conscription" and profoundly changed the United States and Haiti. Rather than laying the seeds for U.S.-style democracy, the United States helped "lay the groundwork for two Duvalier dictatorships and a series of post-Duvalier military regimes." Meanwhile, the depiction of Haitians as dark savages and white Americans as fatherly liberators led to heightened racial awareness and a renaissance in African-American literature.

The book is a postmodern, feminist polemic that will likely not appeal to most *Military Review* readers. While not directly concerned with modern military affairs, it nonetheless has implications for peacekeeping missions that have dominated the scene for the past decade. The book also raises the question of how much an outside intervener can truly change a cultural landscape. From Renda's perspective, one might also ask whether the Western inclination to solve the domestic problems of so-called failed states is not in reality simply a new paternalism.

James H. Joyner, Jr., ***Ph.D., Troy State University, Alabama***

ENDURING WHAT CANNOT BE ENDURED, Doreothy Dore Dowlen, McFarland & Co., Jefferson City, NC, 2001, 193 pages, $29.95.

The title of Doreothy Dore Dowlen's book, *Enduring What Cannot Be Endured,* is a trifle melodramatic, but she can be forgiven the hyperbole. She was 16 when the Japanese invaded her home in the Philippines. Over the next four years she became a lieutenant in the U.S. Army, a nurse for the guerrillas, a prisoner, an escapee, an orphan, a wife, a widow, and a mother.

While still living with her family, Dowlen's various assignments gave her the mobility and access to interact with headquarters, black marketers, and soldiers. She witnessed the guerrillas' internal politics and participated in a gunfight. Yet, despite the dramatics, the book is still very much a highschool girl's history of her family during the war.

Kevin L. Jamison, ***Attorney at Law, Gladstone, Missouri***

DEALING WITH THE DEVIL: East Germany, Détente & Ostpolitik, 1969-1973, M.E. Sarotte, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, 295 pages, $55.00.

International treaties are often in the news, such as recent headlines about the antiballistic missile and Kyoto treaties. But how are they really created? For answers, read *Dealing with the Devil,* which is a detailed look at East and West German relations and treaty negotiations from 1969 to 1973. M.E. Sarotte deftly shows how the events that occurred during that narrow span of time affected and were affected by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. England, France, NATO, Poland, and the Warsaw Pact also had roles, and the Vietnam war produced broad repercussions.

Sarotte's view of Soviet control is one of the book's many strong points. The Soviet Union controlled and slowed East Germany's improved relations with the West so the Soviets could improve their own relations with the West. Sarotte's work in East German archives enabled him to report on the documents and directions the Soviets provided to East German communist leaders. He also provides detailed notes and a comprehensive bibliography. The East German and Soviet records

provide a unique insight into the history of the time and the Soviet perspective.

Comparing the Soviet perspective and control of the East Germans with the relationships between West Germany and the United States is interesting. Sarotte shows how German relations influenced the actions of Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon in improving relations with the Soviet Union and China at the same time.

This informative book will appeal to historians, service members, and students of political science and the Cold War. A key step in improved relations between East and West Germany was the fall of the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain. Those who vividly remember the wall coming down will enjoy reading about how it all began.

MAJ Herman Reinhold, *USAF, Yokota Air Base, Japan*

THE BATTLE OF AP BAC, VIET-NAM: They Did Everything But Learn from It, David M. Toczek, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2001, 185 pages, $62.00.

In 1964, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson said, "I have not thought that we were ready for American boys to do the fighting for Asian boys. What I have been trying to do with the situation that I found, was to get the boys in Vietnam to do their own fighting with our advice and with our equipment."

The United States never intended to commit ground forces to fight in a place called Vietnam. America's preferred role was to train and help the fledgling Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) defeat a Maoist insurgency waged by the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) within South Vietnam and to deter an invasion from the North. That effort failed, necessitating the commitment of U.S. ground forces in strength and leading ultimately to America's least popular war.

In *The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam,* David Toczek explains many of the reasons for early U.S. failures in Vietnam. While Toczek clearly has learned a number of lessons from the battle that he chronicles, he contends that the "they" of his subtitle—the senior leadership of the U.S. Army during the early years of the Vietnam war—did not. Toczek's discussion of why lessons were ignored is of great relevance today as the Army struggles to define its role in supporting failed and failing governments amid the wreckage of the post-Cold War world.

The Battle of Ap Bac took place on 2 January 1963. The 7th ARVN Division attacked to destroy a PLAF force that was protecting a radio station in the Mekong Delta. For the first time in the Second Indochina War, PLAF forces stood their ground, inflicting substantial casualties on the much larger and better-armed ARVN forces and downing five helicopters.

The importance of the fight does not rest in its immediate result, impressive though that was for PLAF guerrilla army forces, but rests in the adversaries' reactions to it. The PLAF conducted what is now described as an after-action review, finding much to admire but also much that it later improved. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army ignored the facts of what Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann, an ARVN adviser on the scene, correctly described as "a miserable damn performance" by the ARVN. Rather than revisiting the foundations of its strategy, based on the assumption that the Government of South Vietnam shared U.S. interest in winning the war, the United States continued to bet ever higher stakes on a losing hand.

The Battle of Ap Bac was made famous at the time by the young journalists who reported it and later for the prominent role it played in Neil Sheehan's Pulitzer Prize-winning *A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam* (New York: Random House, 1988). Toczek's work, a more dispassionate and scholarly analysis than Sheehan's book, deserves to be mentioned in the company of books like H.R. McMaster's *Dereliction of Duty* (New York: HarperCollins *Publishers*, 1997) and Andrew F. Krepinevich's book, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988).

A new generation of Army officers is evaluating the lessons of America's most divisive foreign war, and both the Army and the nation will benefit. Toczek's book deserves a wide audience.

MAJ John A. Nagl, *USA, Fort Riley, Kansas*

THE GREATEST GENERATION SPEAKS: Father's Day: Now and Forever, Tom Brokaw, New Video, NY, 2001, 50 minutes, VHS, $14.95.

Television journalist Tom Brokaw begins the documentary *The Greatest Generation Speaks: Father's Day: Now and Forever* by asking, "What is the greatest generation leaving behind? What do they want us to remember?" The real question should be, "What do we have a responsibility to remember about the Greatest Generation?" That is what the video provides. From Baby Boomers to Generations X and Y, today's society has a responsibility to those who went before. The documentary gives us three things to remember: values, work ethic, and joy for life.

The first vignette provides insight into the emotions of a daughter whose father died during the war. She enlists the help of a researcher and learns that her dad was a hero. In fact, she is able to meet one of her father's comrades who claims that her father saved his life. The knowledge of the way her father lived gives the daughter a strength and pride she had not felt before. Because her father was honorable, courageous, selfless, and honest, she feels she can be that way too and can handle anything life puts in her path. She is not bitter that her father died. Not being bitter is a theme throughout the documentary.

The second vignette provides an example of the sacrifices made by the families of soldiers, sailors, airman, and marines. The survivors' acceptance of those sacrifices gives them an understanding of the preciousness of life. They, also, are not bitter. Rather, they choose to live each day fully and appreciatively.

The final vignette shows the value of work to the Greatest Generation. Good things come from work, and nothing is—nor should be—handed to us. Success is earned one day at a time. This was true for the returning soldiers, sailors, airman, and marines as well as for the

civilians who stayed at home. Ultimately, the Greatest Generation, which was raised during the Great Depression and fought and won World War II, leave a lot for us to remember. Patriotism, selfless service, and honesty are priceless. They provided for the wonderful standard of living Americans now enjoy. They built it through hard work and pride in a job well done. They made the ultimate sacrifice.

MAJ John W. Amberg, II, *USA,*
Fort Riley, Kansas

JEROME BONAPARTE: The War Years, 1800-1815, Glenn J. Lamar, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2000, 176 pages, $62.95.

In *Jerome Bonaparte: The War Years, 1800-1815,* Glenn J. Lamar discusses the role French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte's youngest brother Jerome played during the Napoleonic Wars. Jerome has generally been castigated by historians as being militarily inept and irresponsible as ruler of the puppet kingdom of Westphalia.

Lamar provides a balanced examination of Jerome that neither overtly condemns him or completely exonerates him. Instead, the reader is presented with a balanced portrait of a young man in positions of responsibility that clearly exceeded his capabilities.

Military historians will find the book useful for its discussion of the little-known campaigns in Silesia in 1806-1807 and in Westphalia during the 1809 campaign. The book is well researched and uses primary sources, but because of its narrow focus, I cannot recommend it for the general reader.

CDR John T. Kuehn, *USN,*
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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66 STORIES OF BATTLE COMMAND, James W. Lussier and Adela Frame, eds., U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2001, price unknown.

Any reader fascinated by the process of how battle commanders gain tactical savvy will relish *66 Stories of Battle Command*, but the importance of this lucid, readable book goes beyond that obvious focus. Editors James W. Lussier and Adela Frame present a model of how military stories, communicated with informal candor, can offer a broad, deep analysis of multiple issues pertaining to U.S. Army Transformation.

Stories of tactical decisions are nothing new. Think of Homer's epic poem *The Iliad* as an example. That such an early record of battle-command thinking survives underscores the theme of the storytellers of this collection: battle command is as much art as science.

Twenty battle commanders share 66 stories drawn from their training experiences at the National Training Center (NTC). The tone throughout is conversational, off-the-cuff. No braggadocio surfaces. In fact, several commanders find the battle-command training experience at NTC—succinctly summarized by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Orley Jones—as "quite humbling."

Among the critical issues arising during NTC training, and a point that makes this collection relevant beyond its scope, concerns the limitations of technology and how to overcome such limitations. Colonel (COL) Rick Lynch comments, "People . . . are fixated on this idea that things happen quicker on tomorrow's battlefield given all this digital capability, and that is exactly wrong. [I]t is going to happen at the pace you want because you are in charge."

Underscoring a battle commander's need to remember the human factor in technological settings, LTC Stephen Mitchell describes how his battle plan went awry when his joint surveillance and target attack radar system failed because of a corrupt computer file. "[S]uddenly we were very analog," he notes, and one ponders just how disastrous such a digital failure would have been outside of a training environment.

Make no mistake; there are no Luddite battle commanders here, no pining for "the good old days" before force digitalization. What emerges is the need to constantly shuffle between digital and embodied, concrete battlefields. From an engineer's perspective, LTC John Peabody quite eloquently states, "You are a man of dirt, you have to be *in* the dirt to be a man of dirt."

If digital battlefield data constantly needs human sensory supplementation and in-depth interpretation, battle-command tactics need to be drawn from artistic and intuitive hunches as well as from scientific, rational analysis. Many of these stories underscore the

remarks of COL George Bowers: "Sometimes there is not an empirical why or justification or scientific rationale for making the decision; it's just a gut-level feeling."

The Army Research Institute's research into the role that tacit knowledge plays among Army leaders should be examined in light of commander involvement in more than linear, "by the book," tactical thinking. The implications for Army training go far beyond the realm of battle commanders. How can a new cadre of "Army of One" warriors train to bring artful intuition and adaptive thinking and enhanced situational awareness to future conflicts?

These stories can be read as test beds for spawning new ideas that might be incorporated into future training. This point brings me to this collection's single shortcoming. NTC training brings together Reserve and Active Component soldiers. Collecting stories that highlight whether differences in tactical learning styles between force components surfaced during training might have proved valuable. How might National Guard battle commanders transfer their civilian-based tacit knowledge, and how does their knowledge transfer, mesh, or interfere with active-commander tactical knowledge?

This caveat aside, this book is a lively, insightful, applicable collection of Army tactical thinking. The editors have accomplished what some find unthinkable—an official Army training publication so entertaining it could hold the steadfast attention of civilian readers.

Norman Weinstein, *Ph.D., Boise, Idaho*

VICTORY IN EUROPE 1945: From World War to Cold War, Arnold A. Offner and Theodore A. Wilson, eds., University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2000, 308 pages, $39.95.

In the early 1990s, World War II commemoration activities re-ignited a broad, general interest in that war, and the rapid departure of veterans from the scene reinforced that interest. As a benefit, the increasing availability of archival material is helping scholars who want to revisit the issues that most of us thought had been put to rest.

Victory in Europe 1945: From World War to Cold War, a collection of essays, addresses war termination, which is a topic of contemporary application in light of efforts of succeeding U.S. Government administrations to articulate the exit strategy that must accompany any rational decision to become militarily involved in some type of international operation. How and why did the war in Europe end as it did? What is its significance to an evolving world?

The book is for readers who are generally familiar with the politico-military and strategic perspectives of the war in Europe. The varied essays include such topics as the decision to halt Allied Forces at the Elbe River, 50 miles from Berlin, a decision that allowed Soviet forces to capture the town. Other topics, not as renowned, are significant to the Cold War.

COL James D. Blundell, *USA, Retired, Arlington, Virginia*

CARNAGE AND CULTURE: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, Victor Davis Hanson, Double-day, NY, 2001, 320 pages, $29.95.

Carnage and culture are words that usually bring to mind completely different and almost opposing scenarios. But, in *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power,* military historian Victor Davis Hanson makes a convincing argument that it is precisely the culture of the West (Europe and the United States) that allows its "way of war" to be such a resounding success in world history.

Citing nine battles, ranging from Salamis in 480 BC to Tet in 1968, Davis illustrates how concepts and traditions of freedom, decisive battle, civic militarism, landed infantry, adoption and improvement of technology, capitalism, discipline, individualism, and even dissent and self-criticism have made Western armies into incredible killing machines. These are militaries that have shown an uncanny ability to overcome numeric superiority, brilliant leadership and bravery of their enemies, and even arrogance and bad generalship of their own side.

At a time of culture clash between East and West, this book is particularly relevant. I highly recommend it.

Don Middleton, *Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

WORLD WAR II IN COLONIAL AFRICA: The Death Knell of Colonialism, Richard E. Osborne, Riebel-Roque Publishing Company, Indianapolis, IN, 2001, 414 pages, $22.95.

World War II did indeed encompass the entire globe. In Africa, only the Spanish and Portuguese colonies were not in a state of declared war,but directly or indirectly, all of Africa was involved.

World War II in Colonial Africa, by Richard E. Osborne, focuses on the military events that occurred on land, sea, and air in and around the continent, including the various colonies' efforts to support the war effort. Osborne also relates the important political events that shaped the short- and long-term prosecution of the war and the development of nationalism within the various colonies.

During 1942 and 1943, in the European Theater, the main action focused on the fight for North Africa against German General Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and the U.S. invasion of North Africa and Italy. Africans made important contributions to the success of these ventures. They constructed new air and sea routes that supplied lend-lease equipment and built facilities that became a legacy of ports, roads, railroads, airfields, and industry that colonial governments would not have created under other circumstances.

By 1944 Africa was secure and many staging areas had moved to the continent. In general, the economies of the colonies were doing well. Many jobs in cities were filled with people who, but for the war, would have been living in rural villages. The growth of cities weakened tribal ties, which were replaced with political organizations with nationalistic aims. Greater educational opportunities were also available. France, England, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal, as well as the U.N., are heirs of this African legacy.

MAJ William T. Bohne, *USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas*

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IN KOREA, 1950-1953,

Robert F. Futrell, Air Force History and Museum Program, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2000, 823 pages, $58.00.

CRIMSON SKY: The Air Battle for Korea, John R. Bruning, Brassey's Inc., Dulles, VA, 1999, 232 pages, $18.95.

The year 2000 marked the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the Korean war. Two books, one published in 2000, the other in 1999, detail different aspects of U.S. Air Force (USAF) actions during the Korean war. *The United States Air Force in the Korean War, 1950-1953,* by Robert F. Futrell, covers USAF involvement from strategic policy to cockpit action. *Crimson Sky: The Air Battle for Korea,* by John R. Bruning, focuses primarily on pilots' personal accounts and experiences throughout the war.

Futrell, in his comprehensive account of USAF involvement in the Korean war, states that one of his principal reasons for writing the book was to codify lessons learned and relearned for future planners. The extensively annotated book addresses all aspects of air operations from the highest levels to the lowest, from the opening days of the war through the cease-fire; is an excellent baseline source for research; and provides links to documents, books, and interviews for further research.

Bruning's book is a more personal, intimate look at Korean war air operations. He opens with the account of the first pilots sent from Japan to Korea in June 1950. Subsequent chapters relate stories from across the spectrum—fighters and bombers, victories and defeats—generally following the war chronologically.

Bruning's brief chapters are a type of snapshot in time of a particular unit engaged in the air war. He devotes several chapters to particular characters whose stories are noteworthy for one or another reason. The chapter on Ensign Jesse Brown, the U.S. Navy's first black aviator, is a study in how bonds formed during combat superceded boundaries society imposed. Another chapter tells of George Davis, a pilot whose skill and audacity led to 14 confirmed kills. His daring ultimately led to his own death in aerial combat.

These two books are completely different in scope and purpose. I recommend the first for historical research or background. The second is more appropriate for recreational or informational reading.

CPT Fred Wintrich, *USA,*
Fort Polk, Louisiana

COMMON DESTINY: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, MacGregor Knox, Cambridge University Press, NY, 2000, 320 pages, $27.95.

In *Common Destiny,* MacGregor Knox demonstrates in a most effective way that simply involving the populaces of a country does not necessarily bring about peace. Italy and Germany mobilized their popu-